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Introduction 
"Social planners" and "representative consumers" do not exist. The recent 
game-theoretic  literature on  macroeconomic policy  has  set  the  stage  for 
going beyond  this stylized description of policymaking and building more 
realistic positive  models  of economic policy. In this literature, the policy- 
maker strategically interacts with other current and/or future policymakers 
and  with  the  public;  his  behavior  is  derived  endogenously  from  his 
preferences, incentives and constraints. Since the policymakers' incentives 
and  constraints represent  real world  political institutions,  this  approach 
provides a useful  tool for analyzing the relationship between  politics and 
macroeconomic policy. This paper shows  that this recent line of research 
has  provided  several  novel,  testable  results;  the  paper  both  reviews 
previous  successful tests of the theory and presents some new  successful 
tests. 
Even  though  some  pathbreaking contributions were  published  in  the 
mid-1970s,  (for instance,  Hamada (1976), Kydland-Prescott (1977), Calvo 
(1978)) the game-theoretic literature on macroeconomic policy has only in 
the last five years begun to pick up momentum after a shift attributed to the 
influential work done by Barro  and Gordon (1983a,b) on monetary policy. 
A useful way to classify game-theoretic models of monetary policy is by the 
number and type of players involved  in the game: 
a) games in which a single policymaker plays "against" the private sector 
of the economy.  In these models the policymaker attempts to surprise the 
public with an unexpected  monetary shock to reduce unemployment;1 
1. The private sector is modeled  as populated either by atomistic wage  setters or by unions. 
In  addition  to  Barro-Gordon (1983a,b)  this  model  has  been  studied  under  different 
assumptions  about agents' information by Canzoneri (1985), Backus-Driffill (1985a), Barro 14  ALESINA 
b) games in which different policymakers are in office at different points 
in time; they are elected politicians who  can be voted out of office in favor 
of their opponents;2 
c) games  in which  two policymakers controlling different policy instru- 
ments are in office at the same time in the same economy.  Several authors, 
in particular, study the consequences  of different degrees of independence 
of the Central Bank from the executive;3 
d) games with multiple policymakers in office in different economies  at 
the same time; this is the literature on international policy coordination;4 
This paper,  which  is not  a survey  of the game-theoretic  literature on 
macroeconomic policy5, focuses on empirical implementations  of politico- 
economic models,  and thus on the groups b) and c). 
The positive  and normative implications of these  models  depend  cru- 
cially on  the  objectives  the  policymakers  pursue.  In general,  politicians 
have two motivations.  On one hand, they wish to remain in office as long 
as possible. In this case, the politicians of any party have the same objective 
function,  since they all seek to maximize popularity. On the other hand, 
they may have references defined on policy issues and/or they may pursue 
the economic  interests of different constituencies.  Thus,  different policy- 
makers  maximize  different objective functions  defined  in  terms  of  eco- 
nomic variables. 
If politicians are exclusively  motivated by the desire to hold office (i.e. 
they are only  "office motivated"), they view  winning  an election as their 
only goal; if they have "ideological views" and/or care differently about the 
welfare  of  different constituencies,  they  view  winning  an  election  as  a 
means of implementing  the desired policy. In general, the two motivations 
may coexist; in addition,  even  ideological politicians are better off if their 
chances  of appointment  increase, since they can implement  their desired 
(1986a), Cukierman-Meltzer (1986a) and Hoshi  (1987) in the case of atomistic agents; by 
Driffill (1985), Backus-Driffill  (1985b), and Tabellini (1988a)  for the case of monopolistic labor 
unions. 
2. This literature, which owes much to Nordhaus (1975), includes recent work by Cukierman- 
Meltzer (1986b,c) Alesina (1987), Rogoff-Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1987a), Alesina-Sachs (1988), 
Alesina-Tabellini (1987a,b), Persson-Svensson  (1987), and Tabellini-Alesina (1987). 
3. An  early contribution in this area is Kydland (1976). More recently, see  Sargent-Wallace 
(1981), Blinder (1982), Sargent (1986), Tabellini (1986), (1987a), Loewy (1986), and Alesina- 
Tabellini (1987c). 
4. Since Hamada (1976) this literature has developed  rapidly. For recent surveys  see Fischer 
(1987), and Canzoneri-Henderson  (1988). 
5. A broad survey of this literature includes work by Barro (1986b), Fischer (1986), Cukierman 
(1986), Rogoff (1987b), and  Persson  (1988). A more  specific survey  of politico-economic 
models  can be found in Alesina-Tabellini (1988). Macroeconomics  and  Politics  * 15 
policy  only  if  in  office.  The  difference  between  the  two  cases  rests, 
however,  in the nature of the objective function maximized by politicians. 
Purely "office motivated" politicians have indistinguishable objective func- 
tions; "Partisan politicians" have distinct objectives. 
The first assumption,  based upon  the contribution of Downs  (1957) is, 
although  fairly extreme, the most widely  accepted.  It generates the well- 
known  conclusion  that in a two-party system,  one  should  observe  com- 
plete policy convergence,  i.e. both parties follow the same policy when  in 
office. This is the basic message  of the "median voter theorem."6 
The most influential application of these ideas to macroeconomic policy 
is the "political business  cycle" theory of Nordhaus  (1975), which is based 
upon three assumptions: 1) The policymakers are only "office motivated"; 
2)  they  can  manipulate  an  exploitable  Phillips  curve; 3) voters  are not 
rational since they do not understand that they are systematically fooled by 
the politicians. Thus, the policymakers overstimulate the economy  before 
elections and then reduce inflation with a recession at the beginning of the 
new  term  of  office.  Voters  reward  the  incumbent  for  the  pre-electoral 
expansion without learning from the past that a recession has to follow the 
expansion. 
The theoretical literature on political business  cycles made essentially no 
progress after Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977) for several years, because 
of the  (presumed)  devastating  effect of the rational expectation  critique. 
However,  three important recent papers by Cukierman-Meltzer (1986b), 
Rogoff-Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1987a) address these issues  in models  in 
which  the  policymakers,  the  voters  and  the  economic  agents  behave 
rationally in an optimizing,  general equilibrium framework. These models 
substitute  the  notion  of  asymmetric  information  between  voters  and 
policymakers  to  the  assumption  of  voters'  irrationality. This  generates 
departures from optimality in policymaking which  resemble (but are not 
identical to) those predicted by Nordhaus. 
The second approach views different parties as "ideologically" motivated 
in the sense  that they have partisan goals. Wittman (1977, 1983), Calvert 
(1985) and myself (1988a) show  that, under this assumption,  the "median 
voter theorem" does not hold and different parties follow different policies 
when  in office. Hibbs (1977, 1987a,b) applies this view  to macroeconomic 
policy and argues (on empirical grounds)  that Socialist Parties in Europe 
and  the  Democratic Party in the United  States have  been  systematically 
more expansionary and less averse to inflation than Conservative Parties in 
6. For the original  proof of this theorem  see Black  (1958).  For a more recent treatment  see 
Ordeshook  (1986)  and the references  quoted  therein.  The result  of policy  convergence  in a 
two-party  system is more general  than the "median  voter  theorem." 16 *  ALESINA 
Table  1  POLITICO  ECONOMIC  MODELS  OF BUSINESS-CYCLES 
Non-Rational  Behavior 
and Non-Rational  Rational  Behavior  and 
Expectations  Rational  Expectations 
"Office  Motivated"  Politicians  Nordhaus  (1975)  Cukierman-Meltzer (1986b) 
Rogoff-Sibert  (1988) 
Rogoff  (1987a) 
"Partisan"  Politicians  Hibbs (1977, 1987a)  Alesina (1987) 
Alesina-Sachs  (1988) 
Europe and the Republican Party in the United States. This author claims 
that expansionary and inflationary demand policies redistribute income to 
the lower middle class, which supports in general, left wing parties.7 Hibbs 
(1987a) tests this hypothesis  on the United States with a model based upon 
an exploitable Phillips curve with no consideration of the rational expecta- 
tion critique. 
In a recent paper (Alesina (1987)) I proposed  a game-theoretic model in 
which  two  parties with  different objective functions  strategically interact 
with  each  other  and  with  a  rational public.  This  model  has  different 
empirical implications from both Nordhaus'  "political business  cycle" and 
Hibbs' "partisan cycle"; Alesina-Sachs  (1988) presents  empirical tests  on 
post Second World War United States data which do not reject that model. 
Table  1  summarizes  this  discussion  by  classifying  these  politico-eco- 
nomic models  of the business  cycle along the two most important dimen- 
sions:  the  assumption  about  policymakers'  motivations  and  the 
assumption  about the rationality of voters and of economic  agents.  This 
paper suggests  that the empirical evidence for the United States in the post 
war period  discriminates in favor of the models  in the upper  and lower 
right  corners  of  Table  1,  namely  the  more  recent  rational  models  of 
politico-economic  cycles.  This  argument  is  supported  by  a  review  of 
available empirical evidence  and by several original tests. 
The second  part of this paper examines how  the degree of the Central 
Banks' independence  affects the  magnitude  of political influence  on  the 
economy,  and  monetary  policy.  An  independent  Central  Bank  could 
reduce  the  magnitude  of  politically  induced  fluctuations  in  monetary 
7. Hibbs  (1987a) presents  empirical evidence  on  income  distribution in  the  United  States, 
which is consistent with this view. Minford-Peel (1982) and Minford (1985) argue along the 
same lines for the United Kingdom. Macroeconomics  and  Politics  *  17 
policy,  and,  as pointed  out by Rogoff (1985), an inflation averse Central 
Banker could reduce the inflationary bias in policymaking. Based upon the 
available empirical evidence,  this paper argues tentatively  that indepen- 
dent Central Banks have been associated with a lower average inflation rate 
and may have been responsible for reducing politically induced volatility of 
monetary policy and inflation. 
This  paper  also  briefly  examines  the  empirical  implications  for  the 
policy-mix of the literature on monetary and fiscal policy coordination, in 
which  the two policy instruments are controlled by two independent  and 
(possibly) non-cooperative  policymakers. 
Finally, one should be explicit in emphasizing the difficulties that arise in 
this  line  of  empirical research,  in  which  institutions  and  policymakers' 
behavior are modelled  endogenously.  The first one is a lack of degrees  of 
freedom.  Institutional changes  or even  changes  of governments  are rela- 
tively infrequent events.  Thus, the researcher has few useful observations, 
even  if research is conducted  over a relatively long  period of time.  The 
second  one  is of specification uncertainty. Virtually all these  tests  imply 
some assumptions  about the objective functions of the policymakers. Since 
there is no clear guideline on how to choose these functions (particularly  if 
long time series are used)  there is a degree of arbitrariness in these  tests. 
The third one is due to the difficulty of quantifying crucial variables, such 
as  the  degree  of  political polarization of  different governments,  or the 
degree of Central Banks' independence. 
This paper  attempts  to  convince  the  readers that,  despite  these  diffi- 
culties, empirical research on politico-economic and institutional issues can 
provide important insights on the behavior of the economy. 
Section 2 briefly reviews  the Barro-Gordon (1983a,b) model  of inflation 
bias. Section 3 presents a two party version of this model,  which is tested 
in  Section  4.  Section  5  discusses  recent  models  of  "rational political 
business  cycles."  Sections  6 and  7 consider  the  issues  of  Central Bank 
independence.  The  last  section  addresses  several  directions  of  future 
research. 
2. The  Basic  Model 
Consider a simple version  of a wage  setting model a la Fischer (1977), or 
Taylor (1980). Wage  setters wish  to maintain the real wage  at the level 
compatible with  the  natural rate of unemployment  as generated  by  the 
market. Labor contracts last one period and are signed at the end of, say, 
period  (t -  1) for period  t. These  contracts are uncontingent;  full index- 18 *  ALESINA 
ation,  in  particular, is  excluded.8 Thus,  wage  setters  set  the  growth  of 
nominal wages  equal to expected inflation: 
Wt =  tet=  E(rt/lIt-)  (1) 
where wt = rate of growth of nominal wages; Irt = rate of inflation; E(  )= 
mathematical expectation operator; It  _  = information set available at time 
(t-1).  The superscript "e"  indicates rationally expected variables. Given (1), 
the  supply  function  for this economy  with  no  capital can be written  as 
follows: 
Yt =  (/ t- Tte)  +  y;  Y >  , y  > 0.  (2) 
where  Yt is  real output  growth  and  y  is  the  "natural" rate of  growth 
compatible with the natural rate of unemployment. 
The policymaker has  the following  cost function,  defined  on  inflation 
and output,  where b >>  0,  >  0,  -r  -  0, and 0 <  /  <  1: 
,  1  b 
Z  =  t  - 
(Tt  -  jT)2  +  (yt  -  k)2  (3) 
t=0  2  2 
Assuming  for simplicity that the rate of inflation is identical to the rate of 
money  growth (mt)9  and substituting (2) in (3) one obtains: 
1  b 
Z  =  f3t  (mt  -  m)2  +  -(mt  -  m'  -  k)2  (4) 
t=O  2 
where  b =  b2;  k =  [k -  ];  m  =  i-  0. 
By Okun's Law the model could also be presented using unemployment. 
The  crucial point  is  that  there  is  an  optimal  level  of  money  growth, 
regardless  of whether  it is  expected  or not,  which  is  mh,  and  a positive 
optimal level of unexpected  money  growth,  if k >  y. The first part of the 
objective  function  can be justified  by  a standard argument  of  "optimal 
seignorage." The second term, which plays an interesting role only if k>0, 
can be justified by either of three non-mutually exclusive arguments.  The 
8. Partial  indexation, or even the "optimal degree of indexation" in a more general model with 
demand and supply shocks could be considered without changing the basic message of this 
model.  (Rogoff (1985), Devereux (1987)). 
9. Alternatively, the model could be completed with a quantity equation,  such as mt =  rt + 
Yt. The simplification adopted  in the text simplifies the algebra and the notation without 
affecting in any way the qualitative features of the results. Macroeconomics  and  Politics 19 
first one  is that various distortions in the labor market, such as taxation, 
minimum  wage  laws  etc.,  generate  an  output  growth  without  policy 
intervention  (9) which  is  too  low.  Thus,  the  policymaker  may  want  to 
increase growth, with a monetary shock. The second argument is that labor 
unions  which  maximize  the  welfare  of  employed  union  members  (as 
opposed  to social welfare) keep the real wage  too high,  so that the labor 
market clears with  too much unemployment.  The third argument is that 
the policymaker weighs  heavily  the welfare of the unemployed  and has 
preferences  "inconsistent" with the market. In addition,  the policymaker 
may desire to reduce the real value of non-indexed  government  debt by 
means  of unexpected  inflation, particularly if it disregards the welfare of 
bond holders.10 
If the policymaker cannot make binding commitments to any policy rule, 
the model should be solved by minimizing (4) taking expectations as given. 
This corresponds to the one-shot Nash solution of the game, or to the case 
of "discretionary policy." By differentiating (4) with respect to mt and then 
imposing  mt =  mt, one obtains: 
mt=  m +  bk;  (5) 
Yt =  .  (6) 
If k >  0, the rate of money  growth is higher than its optimal level (m), but 
output is unaffected. This is the well-known  inflationary bias of discretion- 
ary monetary policy; it can be eliminated by a binding commitment to the 
optimal monetary rule: mt = tm. However,  it is well known  that this rule is 
time inconsistent: if the public expects it, the policymaker has an incentive 
to abandon  it and follow  the discretionary policy given  in (5), creating a 
beneficial  inflation  surprise.  This bias  can be  eliminated  or reduced  by 
virtue of reputational mechanisms. 
From a positive  point of view  (5) and (6) have three empirical implica- 
tions: 1) If binding policy rules are not followed  and if reputational forces 
are  not  strong  enough,  the  average  inflation  rate will  be  higher  than 
optimal.  However,  it  is  quite  difficult to  directly  test  this  implication 
because  one  needs  to pinpoint  the unobservable  "optimal inflation rate" 
and  compare  it  with  the  actual one.1  2) For given  preferences  of  the 
policymaker,  i.e.  for given  b and  k, an  increase  in  the  natural rate of 
10. See Calvo (1978), Barro  (1983), Grossman-Van Huyck (1986)  and Poterba-Rotemberg (1988) 
for this interpretation of related models. 
11. Richards (1986) measures  the  inflation rate desired  by  voters  by  means  of  a revealed 
preference argument and compares it with the actual inflation rate in the United States. 
His results are, however,  inconclusive. 20 *  ALESINA 
unemployment  increases  inflation  and  money  growth.  Barro-Gordon 
(1983b) argue that this model explains the positive correlation between  the 
natural rate of unemployment  and the inflation rate from the mid-sixties to 
the late-seventies  in the United States. An interesting question is whether 
or not this model explains the experience of other countries. 3) If left wing 
governments  are  relatively  more  concerned  with  unemployment  than 
conservative  governments,  cross-country  differences  of  inflation  rates 
should be correlated with the political type of government, even if there are 
no cross-country differences in level of unemployment  (see Section 6 of this 
paper).  The  same  is true "a fortiori" if left wing  governments  care less 
about the welfare of the owners  of non-indexed  government  debt,  than, 
say, income tax payers.12 In addition, left wing governments  may desire a 
higher  level  of  government  spending,  and  thus  have  a higher  level  of 
optimal seignorage  (i.e. a higher m). 
3. Political  Cycles  and Economic  Cycles 
This section generalizes  the model  to a two-party system.  First of all, we 
allow  for a more  realistic dynamic  structure in  the  output  equation  by 
assuming  some "persistence" in it. With no loss of generality, we simplify 
notation by assuming  y =  0. Thus, the dynamic equation for output is: 
Yt =  t-1  -+ 7(mt-m);  0 < & <  1.  (7) 
Alternatively, Yt  in (7) can be interpreted as the deviation of output growth 
from its natural level, where the latter may not be constant over time. 
In this economy  two  different policymakers ("parties") can hold office. 
These parties, labelled "D" and "R", have different preferences defined on 
inflation and output. The costs functions of the two parties are as follows: 
1  bD 
ZD  =  t  -(t  - 
mD)2  +  (yt  -  k?)2  (8) 
t=  2  2 
1  bR 
ZR =  E  -t  (m  -  mR)2  +  _-(t  -  kR)2  (9) 
t=O  2  2 
12. Minford  (1985) and  Alesina  (1988b) emphasize  this  point,  with  references  to  several 
historical and recent episodes. Macroeconomics  and  Politics  - 21 
The difference in the objective functions of the two parties is given by: 
m?>D  R;  D>  kR; bD:>.  (10) 
The two parties are not identical if at least one of the three inequalities in 
(10) hold strictly. The first one shows a difference between the optimal rates 
of inflation, which  might reflect different needs  for the inflation tax if the 
two parties' desired level of government spending is different. The second 
and third inequalities indicate a difference in the relative evaluations of the 
costs of inflation and unemployment.13 
Elections take place every two periods. Party D is elected with probability 
P  and  party R with  probability 1-P.  For the  moment,  P  is  treated  as 
exogenous  (later it is shown  how  to derive it from the underlying  prefer- 
ences of the voters.) Elections are held at the beginning  of the period (say 
period  t) and  mt is chosen  immediately  after the election by  the  elected 
party.  The  parties  have  full control over  monetary  policy:  the  issue  of 
Central Bank independence  is addressed in Sections 6 and 7. 
The game described by equations (7), (8) and (9) implies that the policies 
of, say, periods (t-2)  and (t-1)  by the party in office affect the state of the 
world inherited by the party elected in period t, namely Yt-i.  This strategic 
interaction over a state variable between  each government  and its succes- 
sors  is very  difficult to  treat analytically. Alesina-Tabellini (1987a), with 
certain simplifying  assumptions,  solve  a similar game in which  the state 
variable  is  the  public  debt.  McKibbin-Roubini-Sachs (1987) propose  a 
general  method  of  solving  linear quadratic two-party  games  with  state 
variables, but they can only obtain the solution by numerical simulation. 
In  this  paper,  the  game  is  greatly  simplified  by  assuming  that  the 
policymakers' horizon coincides with their term of office; thus the infinite 
horizon game is divided  into a series of two period games.  Therefore, if, 
say, party i, i =  D,R, is elected in period t, it minimizes: 
1  1  bi 
Z  =  3i  (mt+j  -  mi)2  +  -(yt+j  -  ki)2  i: D,R.  (11) 
=0  2  2 
By  substituting  (7) into  (11) one  obtains: 
By substituting (7) into (11) one obtains: 
13. The two parties have an identical discount factor. A difference in the fs  makes the algebra 
more cumbersome  without  adding any insight. 22 *  ALESINA 
1  .  1  b' 
Zi=  /3  2(mt+j  -  mi)2  +  (ayt+j-1  +  mt+j  -  m+j-  k)2 
2  2  j=O 
(12) 
where  b'  =  y2;  ;  ki  =-  i: D,R.  (13) 
Y  7 
In period (t + 2) a new election takes place and the same game is repeated 
and  so  on.  The  model  can  then  be  solved  by  using  (7),  (12) and  the 
following expectation formation mechanism, where mD  and mR  indicate the 
policies chosen  by party D and R in period t. 
m~ =  PmF+e +  (1  -  P)mR+e  if t is an election  period, 
f: 0,2,4.  . .  (14a) 
mt+l+e  =  mD+l+e  if D elected  in period  t  +  f  (14b) 
mt+l+e  =  mF+l+e  if R elected  in period  t  +  (  (14c) 
Equations (14) show that in the first period of a new administration there is 
expectation  uncertainty  because  wage  contracts  are  signed  before  the 
election.  In the second  period, expectations are fully adjusted to the new 
policy regime,  and,  since there is no uncertainty or asymmetric informa- 
tion, we have perfect foresights. Thus, a period has to be interpreted as the 
length of a labor contract. 
In the second period, labeled (t+1), assuming that elections take place in 
period t, the first order conditions and (14) imply: 
ml+l  =  mi +  k'b' -  bi'yt;  i  =  D,  R.  (15) 
In period t, the election year, the first order conditions are given by:14 
=  Ai-  Byt_l  +  Cm;  i  =  D,  R.  (16) 
tmi +  biki[l  +  a/3y(1  +  b')] 
where:  A'  = 
1  +  b'[l  +  /a2y2(1  +  b')] 
ab'[l  +  Oa2y2(1  +  bi)]  1 
B'  = 
;  C+ 
=-  B'.  (17)  1  + bi[1  +  Oa2/2(1  +  bi)I  a 
14. These first  order  conditions  can be obtained  by substituting  (15)  into (12)  and differenti- 
ating with respect  to mD (and mR).  arll~j  vlrl  1~Y~~ LV  tL Macroeconomics  and Politics  .  23 
Using  (14), finally one  obtains: 
mt  =  r  - 
DytD-1;  nD >  0;  0P >  0;  (18a) 
mt  =  nR -  Oyt-1;  7/  >  0;  (  >  0.  (18b) 
AD  -  (1  -  P)ADCR  +  (1  -  P)ARCD 
where:  T7D  = 
1  -  PCD  -  (1  -  P)CR 
BD  -  (1  -  p)BDCR  +  (1  -  P)CDBR 
1  -  PC  (1  -  P)CR 
AR  -  PARCD  +  PCRAD  BR -  PBRCD +  PCRBD 
n  1  -  PCD  -  (1  -  P)CR  1  -  PCD  -  (1  -  P)CR 
Equations (15) and (18) fully describe the dynamic behavior of the money 
supply.  Simple manipulations establish that: 
T  D>TR;  tD+  kDbD> mR +  kRbR.  (21) 
Thus, the constant term for the reaction function of party D is higher than 
that of party R in both periods.  Note  that this holds  if any of the  three 
inequalities in (10) is satisfied. 
If and  only  if bD >  bR  then  the coefficients on lagged  output  are also 
different; in particular we have: 
D >  OR; bDa >bRa.  (22) 
If bD =  bR,  inequalities in (22) hold as equalities and the difference in the 
two parties' reaction functions is restricted to the constant. 
In general, there is also an intertemporal difference between the first and 
second  period of an administration. Even if bD =  bR, the first and second 
period  constants  and  the  coefficients  on  lagged  output  are, in  general, 
different. However,  these  intertemporal comparisons  are much less clear 
cut and robust than the inequalities across parties given in (21) and (22). In 
fact, the former (unlike the latter) are affected by the "last period problem" 
and by the shape of the objective functions. 
Let us now turn to the output equation. Given (14), there is no difference 
in the behavior of output in the second half of the two administrations: 
Yt  + 1 =  at.  (23) 24 *  ALESINA 
This result relies only upon the fact that in the second period there are no 
informational  asymmetries  between  the  policymaker  in  office  and  the 
public.  In period  t instead,  output  behaves  differently depending  upon 
which  administration is in office. Using  (7) and (14) one obtains: 
yt  =  ayt-1  +  y(l  -  P)(m  -  m);  (24) 
y  =  ayt-  1  -  yP(m  -  mt).  (25) 
The solution can be obtained by substituting (18) into (24) and (25). If bD  = 
bR the result is the following: 
Yt =  ayt-  1  +  (l  -  P)  (  D-  R);  (26) 
Yt  =  ayt-1 
-  yp(  D  _  R).  (27) 
Equations  (23),  (26) and  (27) fully  describe  the  dynamic  behavior  of 
output.  They predict a recession in the first half of a Republican adminis- 
tration and an expansion in the first half of a Democratic administration. In 
addition: 1) The more different the two objective functions, i.e.  the higher 
mD is relative to  hR,  and kD relative to kR, the larger (in absolute value) the 
shift will be in the constant of the output equation in the first halves of the 
two  administrations; 2) The higher  (lower) P is the bigger  (smaller) the 
recession in the first half of an R administration and the smaller (bigger) the 
expansion  generated by party D. Since the only "surprise" is the electoral 
result, the less expected this result is, the bigger is the real effect of the new 
policy. 
It is worth emphasizing  that the Republican administrations do not cause 
recessions because they "like" them, but because expected inflation is kept 
high by the existence of the more expansionary policymaker, i.e.  party D. 
Conversely  the  Democratic  administrations  can  achieve  an  expansion 
because inflationary expectations are lowered by party R. 
If bD  > bR,  then the autoregressive coefficient in period t is also different; 
it  is  greater than  a  for  party R and  smaller than  & for  party  D.  The 
implications for the constant are unchanged. 
We can now briefly consider voting behavior and show  that this model 
is consistent with the assumption  that voters are rational and fully under- 
stand the differences in the two parties' preferences. Consider a distribu- 
tion  of  voters  with  different preferences  over  inflation  and  output  (or 
unemployment)  and  assume  that  they  are  fully  informed  about  the 
preferences of the two parties and about the economy.  Let us assume that 
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particular, about the policy most preferred by the median voter. One can 
then  derive  a  function  relating  the  policies  expected  by  voters  to  the 
probability distribution of the electoral result. Thus,  if one  indicates with 
mDe and  mtRe the policies  expected  by the voters  from the two  parties in 
period t, one can derive a function such as 
P  =  P(mDe, mDe1,  mRe, mRe)  (28)  t  /t+  t  t+ 
which maps the expected policies into the probability of electing party D.15 
Since voters have rational expectations, the probability of electing party 
D is given by the value of the function (28) computed  at the point where 
mDe  =  mD,  mRe  =  mR  etc. The result of policy convergence  does not apply 
here. In fact, under the assumptions  of this model,  the two parties cannot 
commit  to  policies  different  than  the  time  consistent  ones  computed 
above.16 For example,  party D would  like to commit  to a lower  money 
growth policy, to reduce the inflationary bias and the output fluctuations, 
and to increase its chances of reelection. However,  since voters  are fully 
informed and rational, they cannot be fooled into believing anything other 
than the time consistent policies.17 
This description of the political process is, obviously,  very stylized.  For 
instance, since the voters in this model are fully informed about politicians' 
preferences, they have nothing to learn; observing today's policy does not 
provide any new  information about the reaction function of future policy- 
makers. Thus,  since voters are forward looking, the probability of reelect- 
ing the incumbent party is not a function of its current and past policies. If, 
instead,  voters have to learn something  about the policymakers in office, 
the probability distribution of the electoral outcome would be a function of 
current and past policies, because the latter convey some information about 
the policymakers' preferences and/or "competence." Some progress in this 
direction is made  by Alesina-Cukierman (1987), Rogoff-Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff  (1987a) in  different  contexts.  These  papers  show  that  rational 
models with asymmetric information generate implications consistent with 
retrospective voting behavior.18 
15. An  explicit derivation  of  such  a function  in a related context  is presented  in  Alesina- 
Cukierman (1987). 
16. This result holds,  even  if the two parties assign some  utility to being elected per se. See 
Alesina (1988a) for more discussion  of this point. 
17. Reputational mechanism  in the repeated game may sustain other equilibrium, with  less 
policy volatility as shown  by Alesina (1987) (1988a). 
18. For an extension of this model that incorporates congressional and mid-term elections, see 
Alesina-Rosenthal  (1988). 26  ALESINA 
4. Partisan  Cycles  in the United  States 
The model  in this section is tested against three possibilities: a) elections 
might have no effects on monetary policy or on the dynamics of output and 
unemployment;  b) the model of "partisan cycles" of Hibbs (1987a), based 
upon an exploitable Phillips curve, which implies that differences in output 
and  unemployment  should  persist  for the  entire  term of  office of  each 
administration: c) the "political business cycle" theory of Nordhaus  (1975), 
which  predicts recessions  at the beginning  of each administration and an 
expansion  at the end,  with no systematic differences between  parties. 
Let us consider  first the money  supply  equation for the case in which 
bD =  bR, so  that  the  difference between  the  two  objective  functions  is 
restricted to  the  constant  term.  Given  the  discussion  in  Section  3,  the 
difference  between  periods  of  the  same  administration  is  disregarded. 
Under these restrictions Table 2 presents a test of the model.  The annual 
rate of growth  of M1 is considered  for the period 1949-1985.19  Given the 
autoregressive  properties  of  M1  two  lagged  values  of  the  dependent 
variable are included as regressor as, for instance, in Barro  (1978). The other 
regressors  in Table 2 are derived  directly from the  theory.  The partisan 
dummy  R assumes  the value of 1 in the years of Republican administra- 
tions  and  zero  otherwise.  Different  specifications  with  (1)  the  rate  of 
unemployment  (u), (2) the difference between the actual rate of unemploy- 
ment  and  the  natural rate of  unemployment,  as  computed  by  Gordon 
(1987) (u*), (3) real output growth  ();  and (4) the deviation of the output 
from potential output,  as computed by Gordon (1987) (y*) are used. 
In all these specifications the partisan dummy has a negative coefficient, 
as predicted by the theory, which  is significant at least at the ten percent 
level,  and  in  one  case  at the  five  percent level.  The coefficients  on  the 
different measures of economic activity also have the sign predicted by the 
theory and are significant at the five per cent level.20 Analogous results are 
19. 1959-1985  M1  data  are  called  from  Citibase.  Preceding  1959  the "old"  definition  of M1  has 
been used. This can be justified  if one assumes that before 1959  policymakers  had one 
"eye" on the old M1. The same regressions  have been performed  using the series M1 
reconstructed  by Litterman  and Weiss at the Minneapolis  Fed; there are no significant 
changes  in the results.  Finally,  note that  by identifying  a "period"  identified  as occurring 
with one year, each administration  lasts four, rather  than two, periods.  Extension  of the 
model accommodating  this point are straightforward. 
20. The coefficients  on lagged economic  activity  and the partisan  dummy remain  virtually 
identical,  if correction  for autocorrelation  is obtained  by using generalized  least squares. 
(These results  are available  upon request.)  Barro  (1978)  presents  a regression  similar  to 
equation (1) of Table  2. He does not consider  partisan  effects, and, in addition  to the 
regressors  considered  in this paper he adds a measure  of the deviation  of government 
spending  from  a normal  value. Note that  a partisan  difference  in the money growth  may, 
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Table 2  DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  ANNUAL  RATE OF GROWTH OF M1 
SAMPLE 1949-1985 (t-STATISTICS  IN PARENTHESIS) 
C  M1(-1)  M1(-2)  u(-1)  u*(-1)  Y(-1)  Y*(-1)  R 
Equation 1  -0.985  0.539  0.204  0.507  -0.895 
R-=0.72  (-1.13)  (3.72)  (1.43)  (3.26)  (-1.74) 
D.W.=2.05 
Equation 2  1.524  0.578  0.235  0.512  -0.929 
R2=0.71  (2.82)  (3.99)  (1.60)  (3.01)  (-1.77) 
D.W.=2.07 
Equation 3  2.478  0.841  0.065  -0.307  -1.527 
R2=0.69  (3.58)  (5.42)  (0.41)  (-2.76)  (-2.59) 
D.W. =2.15 
Equation 4  1.56  0.630  0.167  -0.007  -1.044 
R -0.69  (2.77)  (4.28)  (1.11)  (-2.52)  (-1.91) 
D.W. =2.16 
Definition  of variables:  M1 = rate  of growth  of M1;  u = rate  of unemployment  (per  cent);  u* = difference 
between  actual  and "natural"  rate  of unemployment;  y = rate  of growth  of output  (per  cent);  y* = difference 
between  actual  real  output  and "potential"  output;  R = dummy  assuming  the value  of 1 when a Republican 
President  is in office  and zero otherwise. 
Sources:  unemployment,  output,  and  M1  (from  1959)  from  Citibase;  M1  (1947-1959),  natural  unemployment 
and potential  output  from  Gordon  (1987). 
obtained  with  quarterly  data.  Table  3  displays  the  regression  of  the 
quarterly rate of growth of M1 (1949.1 -  1985.4) on several autoregressive 
terms, the difference between  actual and natural unemployment  (u*) and 
the partisan dummy  R, defined as above. The coefficient on R is negative 
and significant at the five percent level and this result is quite insensitive to 
the lag structure used  for money  growth.  Similar results are obtained by 
testing the other specifications of Table 2 with quarterly data.21 
Several researchers have  found  similar results on partisan effects over 
monetary  policy  using  many  different specifications.  For instance  Hibbs 
(1987a), Tabellini-LaVia (1987), Havrilesky  (1987), Chapell-Keech  (1987), 
Alesina-Sachs  (1988), Beck (1982), (1984), present results consistent  with 
the view that Republican administrations have been associated with tighter 
monetary policy. These studies differ in the sample period, the definition of 
"money" (M1, M2, "monetary base"), the choice of variables included in 
reason why Barro  uses this variable  is that the World  War  II period is included in his 
sample. 
21. The  autoregressive  specifications  in the regressions  of Tables  2 and 3 have been chosen  as 
the best, using standard  criteria.  Specifications  with less autoregressive  terms leave 
autocorrelated  residuals.  Lagrange  multipliers  tests on the specifications  presented  show 
no autocorrelation  of the residuals, while longer lag structures  do not improve the 
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Table  3  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  QUARTERLY  RATE  OF GROWTH  OF M1 
SAMPLE  1949.1-1985.4 
Independent 
variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
C  0.431  3.67 
M1(-1)  0.399  5.06 
M1(-2)  -0.014  -0.17 
M1(-3)  0.189  2.28 
M1(-4)  -0.139  -1.64 
M1(-5)  0.328  4.17 
u*(-1)  0.138  3.78 
R  -0.238  -2.16 
R2 =  0.49 
D.W.  =  2.01 
Sources:  see Table  2. 
the objective functions of the policymakers, the specification of the partisan 
dummies,  and the frequency of data, but they have  qualitatively similar 
implications regarding partisan effects.22 
We now turn to the output and unemployment  equations. Tables 4 and 
5, borrowed from Alesina-Sachs (1988), show  that the qualitative implica- 
tions of the model  are not inconsistent  with  the evidence  on real output 
growth.  Table 4 shows  that in the nine completed  administrations of the 
post-war  period  the  rate of GNP growth  in the  first half of Democratic 
administrations has been higher than in the second half, while the rate of 
growth in the first half of Republican administrations has been much lower 
than in the second  half. The difference in the rate of growth in the first 
halves of the two administrations, and, in particular in the second year, is 
striking. On the contrary, as predicted by the theory, the rate of growth in 
the second half of the two administrations has been very similar. 
Table 5 reports the timing of all the recessions in the post World War II 
period in relation to the preceding  presidential elections.  A few  months 
after  the  election  of  every  Republican  administration,  a  recession  has 
started. Leaving aside the post war recession, which started in November 
1948, five of the seven recessions fit this theory. The two recessions which 
do not fit occurred in the last year of the second Eisenhower administration 
and in the last year of the Carter administration (affected by the second oil 
22. Hibbs (1987a) and Tabellini-LaVia (1987) also show  a partisan behavior of the cyclically 
adjusted federal budget  deficit. However,  neither of these  studies'  sample  includes  the 
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shock.)  Note  that  these  two  recessions  are  also  inconsistent  with  the 
"political business  cycle" theory of Nordhaus,  since they have occurred at 
the end of the term of office. 
Needless  to say, many other factors which are unrelated to the political 
process have contributed to the cyclical fluctuations shown  in Table 4. For 
example, various supply shocks (such as oils shocks), have certainly played 
Table  4  RATE  OF GROWTH  OF GNP (CONSTANT  PRICES) 
DEMOCRATIC  ADMINISTRATIONS 
Year 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Truman  0.0  8.5  10.3  3.9 
Kennedy/Johnson  2.6  5.3  4.1  5.3 
Johnson  5.8  5.8  2.9  4.1 
Carter  4.7  5.3  2.5  -0.2* 
Average  3.3  6.2  5.0  3.3 
Average 
First/Second  Halves  4.8  4.1 
REPUBLICAN  ADMINISTRATIONS 
Year 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Eisenhower  I  4.0  -1.3  5.6  2.1 
Eisenhower  II  1.7  -0.8  5.8  2.2 
Nixon  2.4  -0.3  2.8  5.0 
Nixon/Ford  5.2  -0.5  -1.3*  4.9 
Reagan  I  1.9  -2.5  3.6  6.4 
Average  3.0  -1.1  3.3  4.1 
Average 
First/Second  Halves  1.0  3.7 
Source:  Economic  Report  of the President,  1987. 
*Oil  Shocks 
Note:  This table  is not identical  to Table  2 of Alesina-Sachs  (1988),  due to the recent  revisions  in the GNP 
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Table  5  POST-WORLD  WAR  II RECESSIONS 
Beginning  of  Previous  Election 
Through  Contraction  (Party Elected) 
October,  1949  November,  1948  November,  1948 
(D) 
May, 1954  June, 1953  November,  1952 
(R) 
April, 1958  July, 1957  November,  1956 
(R) 
February,  1961  April, 1960  November,  1956 
(R) 
November, 1970  October,  1969  November,  1968 
(R) 
March,  1975  December,  1973*  November,  1972 
(R) 
July, 1980  January,  1980*  November,  1976 
(D) 
November, 1982  May, 1981  November,  1980 
(R) 
Source:  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
*Oil Shocks. 
an important role. In addition,  military expenditures  for the Korean and 
Vietnam wars may help explain the rapid growth in 1952-53 and in the late- 
1960s. Nevertheless,  the  simple  empirical regularity suggested  by  these 
Tables is rather striking. It should  also be noted  that both Tables 4 and 5 
suggest,  not  surprisingly,  that  there  is  a  lag  between  the  change  in 
administration and the effect of policy changes on the economy. 
The implications of the model can be tested more precisely by analyzing 
the dynamic behavior of quarterly series of output and unemployment.  A 
test  of  the  model  for the  case  of  bD =  bR is  that in  an  autoregressive 
specification  of  output  or unemployment  the  constant  should  shift  up 
(down) in the first half of Democratic (Republican) administrations. 
Table 6 defines  three political dummies  for Democratic administrations; 
analogous notation applies to Republican administrations. A proxy for the 
effects  of  imported  oil  price  on  the  economy  (OIL) is  also  used  as  a 
regressor to account for the most evident exogenous  supply shock.23  Let us 
23. The variable OIL is constructed, following Hibbs (1987a) as: 
OIL =  [(lgPOILt  -  IgPOILt_4)  -  (IgPGNPt-lgPGNPt_4)]xRtx  100 
Where POIL =  price index of imported crude petroleum (Saudi Arabian crude); PGNP = 
GNP  deflator; Rt =  ratio of net  import (import-export) of crude petroleum  over  GNP Macroeconomics  and  Politics  *  31 
Table  6  PARTISAN  DUMMIES  FOR  DEMOCRATIC  ADMINISTRATIONS 
Quarters  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
DD1  1  2  3  4  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
D1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
D2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
define  Yt as the level of real GNP, and let 9t =  (IgYt  -  lgYt-4) x  100,  t = 
(IgYt -  IgYt-l)  x  100 and  yt  =  Yt-Yt  where  Yt is  potential  GNP  as 
measured by Gordon (1987). The following three regressions for the sample 
1949.1, 1985.4 do not reject the model (t-statistics in parenthesis): 
Yt =  1.299 +  0.996  ,t-1  -  0.144 9t-2  -  0.232 Yt-3  -  0.682 OILt_1 
(5.70)  (12.18)  (-1.24)  (-  3.01)  (-2.38) 
+  0.237 DDlt_1  -  0.324 RRlt_1 +  0.328 D2t_1  (29) 
(2.30)  (-3.09)  (1.07) 
R2 =  0.83  D.W.  = 2.02 
=  0.848 + 0.176 Y-1  +  0.082 Y2  -0.196  -3  -  0.616 OIL_1 
(4.96)  (2.12)  (1.01)  (-2.56)  (-2.85) 
+  0.163 DDlt_  -  0.246 RRlt_1 +  0.156 D2t_1  (30) 
(2.12)  (-3.11)  (0.71) 
2 =  0.32  D.W.  =  2.01 
y: =  1.880 +  1.026 y*_- -  0.075 YT-2 -  17.892 OILt_1  + 2.804 DDlt_1 
(0.58)  (12.61)  (-0.91)  (-3.70)  (1.60) 
-6.587  RRlt_1 +  3.403 D2,_1  (31) 
(-3.73)  (0.64) 
R2 =  0.95  D.W.  =  1.97 
(annual  average).  Sources:  for POIL  International  Monetary  Fund (IFS);  for import  and 
export of petroleum  Statistical  Abstract  of the United States;  for all the other variables 
Citibase.  Due to missing  data  for POIL,  the variable  OIL  assumes the value of zero from 
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The autoregressive specifications of (29), (30) and (31) have been chosen as 
the  "best,"  using  standard  criteria (see  footnote  21); in  any  case,  the 
significance and the value of the coefficients on the political dummies  are 
robust to different autoregressive specifications of the dependent  variable. 
The dummies DD1 and RR1  capture the idea that it takes about two to three 
quarters for a change of policy to achieve its full effect on output, and that 
the  effects  of  the  new  policy  gradually  disappear  after seven  or  eight 
quarters, since the economy  adjusts, as predicted by the theory. The two 
dummies RR1  and DD1 in (29) and (30) have the expected sign and are both 
significant at the five percent level. In (31) RR1 is strongly significant, while 
DD1  is  borderline  significant  at the  ten  percent  level.  The  theory  also 
predicts  that there  should  be  no  difference in  the  constant  term in  the 
second  half of the  two  administrations: the  dummy  D2 has,  in fact, an 
insignificant coefficient in all the equations. The variable OIL is significant 
in all the equations and has the expected sign. 
A similar picture emerges for unemployment,  as shown by the following 
two  regressions  on  unemployment  (u), and  on  the  difference between 
actual and natural unemployment,  as measured by Gordon (1987) (u*). The 
only  difference between  the  regressions  on  output  and  those  on  unem- 
ployment is that we allowed for an additional quarter lag between  changes 
of policies (and oil shocks) and their visible effect on unemployment.  This 
specification  is  consistent  with  the  assumption  that  production  reacts 
sooner than employment  to policy shocks. 
ut =  0.292 +  1.602 ut_1 -  0.898 ut-2 +  0.241 ut-3  +  0.213 OILt_2 
(2.49)  (19.29)  (-6.48)  (3.04)  (2.92) 
-0.041  DDlt_2  +  0.060  RRlt_2  -  0.039  D2t_2  (32) 
(-1.57)  (2.19)  (-0.50) 
R2=  0.97  D.W.  =  2.00 
U  =  -0.006  +  1.598 u_  -  0.887 u  2  +  0.223 u  3 +  0.192 OILt_2 
(-0.13)  (19.16)  (-6.37)  (2.77)  (2.65) 
-  0.040  DDlt_2  +  0.056  RR1t_2  -  0.053  D2t_2  (33) 
(-1.55)  (2.04)  (-0.68) 
R2 =  0.97  D.W.  =  1.99 
Using the same criteria of footnote 21, the specification with three autore- 
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the five percent level, while the dummy DD1 is borderline significant at the 
10 percent level. The dummy D2 is insignificant, as predicted by the theory. 
Analogous  results are obtained by using  different specifications of the 
political dummies,  for instance by using  D1 and R1 rather than DD1 and 
RR1 (see Table 6). Here is the regression of y using D1 and R1, lagged two 
quarters: 
It =  1.26 +  1.047 9Y-1 -  0.184  t-2 -  0.251 9-3 
(4.75) (12.89)  (-1.54)  (3.19) 
-  0.693 OILt_l+  0.665 Dlt_2  -  0.656 Rlt_2+  0.342 D2t_2  (34) 
(-2.35)  (2.10)  (-2.08)  (1.07) 
R2 =  .83  D.W. =  2.09. 
As before, the dummies  D1 and R1 are significant at the five percent level 
with the correct sign and the dummy  D2 is insignificant.24 
The general picture emerging from these results (and from many other 
regressions  available upon  request), is that if one  allows  for one  or two 
quarters between  the change of the administration and the observation of 
the effect of the "new policies" on output and unemployment,  the model 
presented  in Section 2 is not rejected by the data.25 
These results discriminate in favor of this model  against the two  other 
politico-economic models of output and unemployment-Nordhaus'  "po- 
litical business  cycle" and Hibbs' "partisan cycle." 
Nordhaus'  "political business  cycle" implies that the coefficients on the 
24. It should also be emphasized  that  the significance  of the partisan  dummies  is not due to 
the particular  variable  used to correct  for oil shocks. For  instance,  if the variable  OIL  is 
excluded  by regression  (29)  one obtains: 
Yt  =  1.234 +  1.025  t,_- -  0.157  t-2  -  0.228 9-3  +  0.227 DDlt1_ 
(5.36) (12.47)  (-1.33)  (-2.91)  (2.17) 
-  0.353 RRlt_  +  0.176 D2t_ 
(-3.33)  (0.57) 
R2 =  .80;  D.W.  =  1.98 
Similar  results  are obtained  for the other  regressions  (30)/(34). 
25. Chapell-Keech  (1987)  present  results  which are consistent  with the model of this paper. 
They  assume  that the public  forms  expectations  on money growth  (as in Barro  (1978))  by 
looking at lagged values of money growth and other lagged variables.  Since monetary 
policy  is systematically  different  under  the two administrations,  expectations  do not adjust 
immediately  to a change  of party  in office,  causing  a cycle  on unemployment  similar  to that 
of the model of the present  paper.  Alesina-Sachs  (1988)  also note that the "unexpected 
money  variable"  of Barro  (1978)  show a "partisan  behavior,"  although  with some relevant 
exceptions. 34 *  ALESINA 
dummies  DD1  and  RR1 (or D1  and  R1) should  be  identical  and  both 
negative.  This theory, in fact, predicts a recession at the beginning  of any 
administration.  The  tests  presented  in  this  section  can be  appropriately 
compared to those performed by McCallum (1978) for the Nordhaus' cycle. 
McCallum includes  a  dummy  that captures  the  Nordhaus'  cycle  in  an 
autoregression  of  unemployment.  For instance,  in  one  of  McCallum's 
specifications this dummy  (EV) assumes  the values of 1 in the second half 
of  each  administration  and  zero  otherwise;  no  evidence  of  "political 
business  cycles" was found in the sample used  (1949, 1974). By repeating 
the same regression  on the longer sample now  available (1949.1-1985.4), 
controlling for the oil shocks, and using the same dummy EV, one obtains: 
ut =  0.307  +  1.673ut_1  -  0.935ut_2  +  0.214ut_3 
(3.12)  (20.52)  (-6.62)  (2.68) 
+  0.2220ILt_2 -  0.085EV  (35) 
(3.05)  (-1.53) 
R2 =  0.97  D.W.  =  2.02 
In equation (35) the dummy  EV has the correct sign and it is borderline 
significant at the  10 percent level.  However,  note that the model  of this 
paper  and  that  of  Nordhaus  have  similar  qualitative  implications  for 
Republican administrations. Thus,  equation (35) cannot be taken as sup- 
portive of Nordhaus'  cycle because it does  not control for partisan differ- 
ences.  This regression  also suggests  why  some  researchers, such as,  for 
instance, Tufte (1978) and Haynes-Stone  (1987a,b), find support for Nord- 
haus' cycle, particularly if partisan differences are ignored. 
The  results  presented  above  also  discriminate against  Hibbs'  (1987a) 
formulation of "partisan cycles." In contrast with the predictions of Hibbs' 
model,  the  difference  between  output  and  unemployment  in  the  two 
administrations appears exclusively in the first halves. 
The model  of Section 3 assumes  that the public knows  with  absolute 
precision the objective function of each new government; the knowledge  is 
tempered  only  by  the  uncertainty  factor of  stochastic  electoral results. 
Several authors, including Backus-Driffill  (1985a,b), Barro  (1986a), Tabellini 
(1988a), Cukierman-Meltzer (1986a), and Hoshi (1987), study the situation 
wherein  the public is uninformed and has to learn the preferences of new 
policymakers.  This learning process makes the dynamic pattern of infla- 
tion, unexpected  inflation, output,  and unemployment  richer than in the 
model  of this paper. The empirical implications of these  learning models 
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Consider the case in which  a very conservative administration is elected, 
say a Republican administration with  a very  low  bR, 1mR and kR. In this 
situation,  the  public may  take time to learn the  true preferences  of the 
"conservative"  policymaker  and  expected  inflation  may  remain  higher 
than actual inflation for several periods,  causing  a prolonged  recession. 
This additional element of asymmetric information (in addition to electoral 
uncertainty) can explain why  sharp disinflations  can be  associated  with 
sharp and relatively long lasting recessions. 
Future research could examine the empirical evidence of other industrial 
democracies from the same point of view  as the model of Section 3. This 
task is difficult for a least four reasons: first, one has to focus upon countries 
that have clearly identifiable "left" and "right" parties (or coalitions) and in 
which  there have been  several changes  of governments  from left to right 
and vice versa. Second, in most countries (excluding the United States) the 
timing of elections is endogenous,  a feature which requires some important 
adjustment in the theoretical structure of the model and in the nature of the 
empirical tests. Some progress in this direction is made by Terrones (1987). 
Third, the monetary policies of most industrial countries have been more 
constrained than the United States' policy by the exchange rate regimes. 
The effects of the transition from the Bretton Woods system to floating rates 
to (for some countries) the European Monetary System cannot be ignored. 
For instance  the  EMS can be viewed  as a "commitment  technology"  to 
restrain inflationary  governments.  Fourth,  the  conditions  of  the  world 
economy,  and,  in  particular, of  world  demand,  strongly  influence  the 
performance of small open  economies;  thus,  different governments  may 
face  very  different  constraints  when  in  office.  Alt  (1985) provides  an 
insightful attempt to deal with some of these issues in the context of several 
countries. 
5. New "Political  Business  Cycles"  Theories 
Three recent papers by  Cukierman-Meltzer (1986b), Rogoff-Sibert (1988) 
and  Rogoff (1987a) have  reconsidered  "political business  cycles"  of  the 
Nordhaus'  type in rational game-theoretic models.  In these models,  poli- 
ticians do not have partisan views.  A well-defined  social welfare function 
exists,  but  it  is  partially or completely  disregarded  by  office-motivated 
politicians, who  are willing to depart from optimality if, by doing so, they 
increase their chances of reappointment.  Voters and economic agents are 
rational, but  are imperfectly informed  about  some  aspects  of  either the 
economic environment and/or the characteristics of the policymakers. This 
asymmetry  of information generates an incentive for the policymakers to 
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In  Cukierman-Meltzer  (1986b) there  is  an  asymmetry  of  information 
between  voters  and  policymakers about the  realization of shocks  in the 
economy.  In Rogoff-Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1987a) voters do not have full 
information about the  "competence" of the policymakers; they  can only 
observe  it with  a lag.  "Competence" is defined  as the ability to provide 
public goods  or transfers efficiently, i.e.  minimizing  waste.  Since voters 
prefer competent  policymakers, the latter would  like to appear as compe- 
tent as possible. Thus, before elections, politicians engage in highly visible 
budget activities, such as increases of personal transfers, provision of new 
public services or goods,  reduction of taxes or of prices of public services; 
these policies may also be accompanied by monetary financing, and may 
generate a monetary cycle. Note that since this tactic is effective, if and only 
if the voters do not acquire enough  information to compute the budgetary 
or inflationary consequences  of it, these budget cycles would  have to take 
place immediately before elections,  otherwise  they would  be counterpro- 
ductive to the goals of politicians. These budget  and, possibly,  monetary 
cycles described above may imply very little or nothing at all for a four-year 
cycle on employment;  thus they are consistent with the lack of empirical 
evidence  for the Nordhaus'  "political business  cycle." 
Personal transfers are one of the most visible means of increasing voters' 
disposable income before elections. Thus, in Rogoff's (1987a) terminology, 
transfers provide a signal of competence which is very easy for politicians 
to make use of. By carefully looking at the elections from 1960 to 1976, Tufte 
(1978) concludes  that  personal  transfers were  usually  increased  in  the 
Table  7  TRANSFERS  AND ELECTIONS 
Dependent  variable:  TR = Ratio  of net transfers  over GNP;  seasonably  adjusted 
quarterly  data 
Sample:  Equation  1: 1949.1-1985.4  (t-statistic  in parenthesis) 
Equation  2,3: 1961.1-1985.4  (t-statistic  in parenthesis) 
C  TR(-1)  TR(-2)  TREND  U  EV1  EV2  FD 
Equation  1  -0.183  0.757  0.010  0.008  0.135  0.056  0.037 
R  =  0.97  (-1.37)  (8.77)  (0.12)  (3.97)  (4.08)  (1.10)  (1.18) 
D.W.  =  1.87 
Equation  2  0.070  1.093  -0.240  0.007  0.070  0.128  0.060 
R  =  0.98  (0.54)  (10.49)  (-2.55)  (2.46)  (2.29)  (2.46)  (2.48) 
D.W.  =  1.93 
Equation  3  0.013  1.106  -0.255  0.006  0.070  0.117  0.073 
R  =  0.99  (0.10)  (10.78)  (-2.66)  (2.36)  (2.32)  (3.00)  (2.95) 
D.W.  =  1.97 
Source:  Citibase. All the variables are defined  in the text. Macroeconomics  and  Politics  .  37 
Table  8  DUMMIES  USED  IN TABLE  7 
Quarters  of Each  Administration 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
EV1  -1  -1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
EV2  -1  -1  0  0  0  0  1  1  -1  -1  0  0  0  0  1  1 
months  immediately preceding the November elections.  On the contrary, 
federal payments  for social security and unemployment  insurance "have 
increased more rapidly after the elections." 
By  focusing  on  personal  transfers,  Table 7  provides  some  statistical 
support for Tufte's claim and, indirectly, for the "political budget cycle" of 
Rogoff  (1987a) and  Rogoff and  Sibert (1988). The  ratio of  net  personal 
transfers (total personal transfers to U.S.  citizens,  less personal contribu- 
tions to social insurance) over GNP is considered to be a measure of "net 
personal transfers." This ratio shows  an increasing trend throughout  the 
sample  period,  a trend possibly  reversed  only by the administrations of 
President Reagan.  (For a politico-economic  explanation of this trend see 
Anderson  (1987)). In the regressions of Table 7 two autoregressive terms 
and a time trend are used as regressors.26  Unemployment  is also included, 
since some components  of the transfers increase automatically with it. The 
two  electoral dummies  EV1 and EV2 are defined  in Table 8.  A positive 
coefficient on  them  signals the existence  of a political budget  cycle.  The 
dummy  EV1 refers only to Presidential elections, while EV2 includes both 
Presidential  and  mid-term  elections.  Note  that the  November  elections 
occur in the middle of the fourth quarter of the year; thus it is unclear, in 
principle, whether this quarter should be considered pre- or post-electoral. 
Tufte  (1978), however,  shows  that  in  several  elections  the  increase  in 
transfers payments occurred in the fourth quarter of the year in October or 
even  in early November,  but before the elections.  In addition,  transfers 
actually paid in, say, December may have been announced  and approved 
before the elections. The dummy FD assumes the values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 
the first, second,  third and fourth quarter of the fiscal year respectively, to 
control for possible  fiscal cycles. For instance, government  spending  may 
be relatively higher at the end of the fiscal year.27 
Table 7  shows  that  the  electoral dummies  are significant  at the  five 
26. The same criteria  of footnote 21 are used to choose the best autoregressive representation. 
27. Until 1976 the fiscal year started on July 1; since 1976 it has started on September 1. FD 
assumes  the value of 1 in the transitional quarter. 38 *  ALESINA 
percent level for the sample period of 1961-1985.28  They are not significant 
if one includes the earlier period; this result is consistent with Tufte's ob- 
servation that the Eisenhower administrations did not follow this pattern. 
In summary, the evidence discussed by Tufte and these regressions are, 
broadly speaking,  consistent  with  a "political budget  cycle" on personal 
transfers. Needless  to say, "political budget cycles" could be observed on 
many other variables, such as other types of government  expenditures  or 
prices of public services. Also, as noted by Rogoff (1987), this theory could 
be  tested  on  a  much  larger data  set  by  considering  state  or even  city 
elections. 
The existence of a monetary cycle with increasing money growth before 
elections,  and  reductions  after the  elections  is  an  open  question.  Tufte 
(1978) presents some qualitative evidence for such a cycle, but only for the 
period  1961-1976. Grier (1987) and  Meiselman  (1986) find  statistical evi- 
dence  for political monetary  cycles,  but,  again,  this  excludes  the  1950s. 
Meiselman  cautiously  concludes  that  some  but  not  all  administrations 
show  some  evidence  of a political monetary cycle. 
The election of 1972, when  President Nixon ran as the incumbent, might 
serve as the "textbook example" of pre-electoral manipulation of economic 
policy. On October 1, 1972, social security payments were increased by 20 
percent and indexed to inflation. At the same time, in the last two quarters 
of 1972, M1 was growing at an annual rate of almost 8 percent, compared 
with an average of about 4 percent in the following three years, and about 
5 percent in the preceding three years. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  political budget  cycles  based  upon 
asymmetric information are not inconsistent with the partisan behavior of 
policymakers.  For  instance,  Alesina-Cukierman  (1987)  moves  a  step 
towards  integrating  these  two  approaches  by  building  a  model  with 
"partisan" parties and imperfectly informed voters.29 
6. Inflation  Bias,  Political  Cycles  and  Central  Bank 
Independence 
In most industrial countries monetary policy is not directly controlled by 
the government,  since a certain degree of independence  is granted to the 
28. The coefficients on EV1 and EV2 for the sample 1961-85 remain significant, at least at the 
10% level  if the  dummy  FD and/or unemployment  are dropped  as  regressors.  These 
additional regressions are available upon request. 
29. Frey-Schneider (1978) test a model which attempts to capture both partisan and electoral 
incentives.  However,  their model  is  not  based  on  an  optimizing  framework and  it is 
impossible  to interpret their results from the point of view  of this paper. Haynes-Stone 
(1987a) emphasize  the coexistence of these two incentives.  See also Alt-Chrystal (1983). Macroeconomics  and  Politics  *  39 
Central  Banks.  The  models  of  the  preceding  sections  suggest  that  by 
reducing  the  influence  of  the  executive  on  the  Central Bank, the  infla- 
tionary bias and the excessive volatility in policymaking, due to the political 
cycle, could be reduced. 
Consider  again the  model  of Section 3.  The discretionary equilibrium 
described there is suboptimal for two reasons: First, the average inflation is 
too  high  because  politicians  have  an  incentive  to  generate  a  monetary 
surprise;  second,  the  partisan  monetary  policies  generate  suboptimal 
fluctuations in money  supply and in output and unemployment.  It can be 
easily shown  that the optimal monetary rule for the two parties in every 
period is: 
mp  =  mR =  kD  +  (1  -  X)IR;  O <  X <  1.  (36) 
Both parties are better off by committing to a "cooperative" monetary 
rule, which eliminates inflationary bias and excessive policy fluctuations.30 
In (36) A  represents the weight attributed to the objectives of party D in the 
agreement.  Thus, the higher (lower) is A, the closer the policy chosen is to 
the bliss point of party D (R) between  the parties. Alesina  (1987) (1988a) 
shows  how  A can be chosen as a result of a bargaining game in which the 
party with a higher probability of election receives more weight. 
The  problem  is  that  this  rule  is  time-inconsistent.  If  there  are  no 
enforcement mechanisms,  the party in office has an incentive to manipu- 
late  monetary  policy  for  either  partisan  and/or  electoral  motives,  and 
abandon  the rule. Two  types  of enforcement  help  in sustaining  cooper- 
ation: first, reputational considerations  can raise the costs  of a deviation 
from the optimal "cooperative" behavior; in fact, such a deviation may be 
"punished"  by voters and by future governments,  possibly  of the oppo- 
nent  party. Alesina  (1987) (1988a), Alesina-Spear (1987), Ferejohn (1986) 
and Rogoff-Sibert (1988) explore reputational games in two-party systems, 
and show how the pure discretionary outcome can be improved. However, 
reputation does  not  solve  the problem completely,  unless  politicians are 
very far-sighted. In addition, these  mechanisms  require much sophistica- 
tion and coordination of strategies, as emphasized  by Rogoff (1987b). 
Since concerns for reputation may not be a sufficiently strong incentive to 
ensure cooperation, certain institutions could be designed  to help achieve 
the  optimal  outcome,  such  as  a  Central Bank, independent  from  each 
current government.  If the politicians currently in office do not have direct 
control over monetary policy, they cannot engage  in partisan or electoral 
30. In this example,  the  optimal rule is  of the  K-percent type.  More generally,  it may  be 
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policymaking. In addition, as suggested by Rogoff (1985), the appointment 
of a Central Bank particularly  averse to inflation can reduce the inflationary 
bias. However,  assuming  that political parties have separate "ideological" 
goals,  they would  not be able to agree in general, on how  "conservative" 
(i.e. anti-inflationary) the Central Banker should be. Thus, the choice of a 
Central  Banker  requires  a  compromise,  as  shown  in  (36); perhaps  a 
bi-partisan committee, rather than the current administration alone should 
be in charge of supervising  the Central Bank. This institutional arrange- 
ment  isolates  monetary  policy from short-run partisan or electoral pres- 
sure.  On  the other hand,  a bi-partisan control may still guarantee  some 
"democratic" supervision  of  monetary  policy  and  avoid  the  risk  of  a 
Central Bank developing  into a bureaucratic body,  unresponsive  to social 
welfare.  This criticism of independent  Central Banks has been  made  by 
Friedman (1982) among others. 
In summary, by isolating the Central Bank from direct political pressure 
from each current government,  three goals can be achieved: 1) reduction of 
the inflation bias; 2) reduction of partisan variability in monetary policy; 3) 
reduction of pre-electoral manipulation of monetary policy. 
These  propositions  can, in principle, be tested  by analyzing  countries 
whose  Central Banks have different institutional arrangements. These tests 
require first a classification of the degree  of "independence"  of different 
Central Banks, which is not easy to compute. The degree of independence 
of Central Banks is affected by at least four factors: 1) the institutional and 
formal relationships  between  the  Banks and  the executive; for instance, 
who  (and how  often) appoints  Central Bankers, the presence  of govern- 
ment officials in the board of directors of the Banks, and the requirements 
of government's  approval of specific policies; 2) informal relationships and 
contacts  between  Central  Bankers  and  members  of  the  executive;  3) 
budgetary and financial relationships between  the Central Bank and the 
executive; 4) macroeconomic relationships,  such as the existence  of rules 
forcing the Central Bank to accommodate fiscal policy. 
Quantifying these elements is not easy; debates on how independent  the 
Federal Reserve really is from the President and/or from the Congress in 
the  United  States  illustrate  this  difficulty.31 Nevertheless,  Bade-Parkin 
(1985) and  Masciandaro-Tabellini (1988) provide  courageous  attempts  to 
classify the degree of independence  of several Central Banks. 
Bade-Parkin (1985) consider twelve countries for the floating rates period 
31. Woolley (1984) provides a detailed discussion of this issue.  In agreement with Weintraub 
(1978) and Stein (1985) this author concludes that despite the formal independence  of the 
Federal Reserve, the President had an important influence on monetary policy. The same 
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Table 9  INFLATION, CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING (1973-1985) 
Rate of 
Degree  of  Average  Government 
Central  Bank  Inflation  Rate  Spending 
Independence  (GNP Deflator)  Over GNP 
Countries  (1)  (2)  (percent)  (3) 
Italy  1/2  16.1  35.6 
Spain  1  15.2  26.2 
New  Zealand  1  12.7  36.4 
United Kingdom  2  12.3  37.3 
Australia  1  10.5  28.4 
France  2  10.2  39.1* 
Sweden  2  9.8  38.3 
Denmark  2  9.1  39.7 
Norway  2  8.8  38.3 
Canada  2  8.1  23.1 
United States  3  7.2  21.7 
Belgium  2  6.8  36.0 
Netherlands  2  5.8  35.4 
Japan  3  5.0  16.2 
Germany  4  4.1  29.3 
Switzerland  4  4.0  9.0 
Sources:  (1) Bade-Parkin  (1985),  Masciandaro-Tabellini  (1988);  Fair  (1980). 
(2) Hansson  (1987).  Original  source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  IFS. 
(3) International  Monetary  Fund,  IFS. 
*ratio  computed  over GDP. 
and classify their Central Banks in four groups, from the least independent 
(group 1) to the most independent  (group 4). They consider two dimen- 
sions  of  independence-political  and  financial  (i.e.  criteria 1,  2  and  3 
respectively).  Political independence  appears more relevant, and it is the 
criterion emphasized  in this paper. In Table 9, Bade and Parkin's sample is 
extended  to include  New  Zealand and  Spain, by  using  the  institutional 
information  provided  by  Masciandaro-Tabellini (1988) and  Fair (1980), 
respectively.32 The first two columns of Table 9, which is an extended and 
updated version of a similar table in Bade-Parkin  (1985), show that, broadly 
speaking,  there is an inverse relationship between  the degree of indepen- 
dence  of Central Banks and the average inflation rate. The two countries 
32. Masciandaro-Tabellini (1988) show  that the Central Bank of New  Zealand is by all criteria 
less independent  than Australia's Central Bank, which is classified in group 1 by Bade and 
Parkin. Fair (1980) reports that, unlike in any other country in this sample,  in Spain "all 
measures-taken  by  the  Central  Bank-are  subject  to  approval  of  Ministry  of  the 
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with  the most  independent  Central Banks had the lowest  inflation. The 
most dependent  Central Banks (group 1) had some of the highest inflation 
rates.33 
This correlation, however,  does  not necessarily establish a causal link. 
For instance, this relationship may be due to the fact that countries with a 
preference for low inflation also prefer more independent  Central Banks. 
Or, countries with  the strongest anti-inflationary preferences believe  that 
the most  effective way  to achieve their target is by delegating  control of 
monetary policy to an independent  agency. 
In addition,  Central Banks' independence  is not  the  only  institutional 
explanation  for cross-sectional  differences  in  average  rates  of  inflation. 
Hansson  (1987) provides  an encouraging attempt to explain these  differ- 
ences in terms of several other sociological and institutional characteristics. 
By a cross-sectional and time series analysis, he shows  that the position of 
the  government  in  the  left-right-wing  spectrum,  the  various  proxies  of 
social consensus  (such as strike activities and index of labor conflicts), and 
the effects of oil shocks, together with Central Bank independence  explain 
the different inflation rates in different countries. However,  even account- 
ing for these socio-political differences, the degree of independence  of the 
Central Bank remains a significant variable. 
An additional factor not considered by Hansson  (1987), but which may 
also  be  important  and  related  to  the  political  orientation  of  different 
governments  is the size of the public sector, measured,  for example,  by 
government  spending  over GNP.  A higher level  of desired  government 
spending may require a higher level of seignorage. Table 9 shows that there 
may be some correlation between  the size of government and the inflation 
rate. This correlation is, however,  far from perfect. For instance,  Belgium, 
the Netherlands,  and Germany appear as outliers. Further research may 
shed more light on this issue.34 
The  second  question  is  whether  or  not  independent  Central Banks 
reduce politically induced variability in monetary policy. To answer such a 
question  we  would  need  a detailed study  of political monetary cycles in 
several  different countries,  a task which  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  the 
present  paper.  However,  consider  three  cases:  the  United  Kingdom, 
33. Bade  and Parkin's  classifications  disregard  institutional  changes  in the period  considered. 
The  Italian  Central  Bank  obtained  more  economic  independence  in 1982  (Tabellini  1988b). 
Given this change  we classified  Italy  as 1/2  rather  than 2, as in Bade-Parkin. 
34. Mankiw  (1987)  reports  a positive  correlation  between  level of inflation  and tax  burden  in 
the United States. Poterba-Rotemberg  (1988)  do not find the same correlation  in other 
countries.  An insightful  explanation  suggested  by these authors  for  their  results,  which is 
consistent  with the present  paper,  is that  the government's  objective  function,  which  leads 
to the choice  between inflation  and other taxes, may change over time as a function  of 
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Germany, and the United States. In the United Kingdom, with a relatively 
dependent  Central Bank, the pattern of macroeconomic policy in general, 
and monetary policy in particular, has been quite "partisan", according to 
Hibbs (1977), Minford-Peel (1982), Minford (1985) and Alt (1985). On the 
contrary, partisan volatility in monetary policy  has been  less  evident  in 
Germany, which has a much more independent  Central Bank. The United 
States  may  fall somewhere  in  between.  These  three  countries  allow  a 
suggestive  comparison,  given  in  Table 10, because  they  experienced  a 
change of government  from "left" to "right" at roughly the same time in 
the  early eighties.  Both the  average and the variance of inflation across 
regimes  is  highest  in  the  United  Kingdom,  lowest  in  Germany,  and 
intermediate in the United States. 
7. Central  Bank  Independence  and  the  Policy  Mix 
A second  important effect of Central Bank independence  is on the policy 
mix. Fiscal and monetary policy are controlled by two  authorities which 
are, at least partially, independent,  but they are linked by the intertemporal 
government  budget  constraint. This institutional arrangement generates 
interesting strategic interaction if the two authorities have different prefer- 
ences  over the policy mix. 
Fiscal authorities may face electoral and partisan incentives  that could 
Table 10  AVERAGE INFLATION RATES IN SELECTED  PERIODS: 
GERMANY,  UNITED  KINGDOM,  UNITED  STATES  (GNP  DEFLATOR, 
AVERAGE  IN ANNUAL  RATE  OF GROWTH,  PERCENT) 
Bade-Parkin's 
Difference  Index  of 
(a)  (b)  (a)-(b)  Independence 
Social Democrats  Christian Democrats  1.8  4 
1975-82  1983-85 
Germany  4.3  2.5 
Labourists  Conservatives 
1975-79  1980-85 
U.K.  16.3  9.0  7.3  2 
Carter  1977-80  Reagan  1981-85 
U.S.  8.0  5.4  2.6  3 
Source:  For Germany  and  United  Kingdom: International Monetary Fund,  IFS. For the  United  States: 
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encourage  them  to  generate  "excessive"govemment  spending  and/or  a 
deficit bias. Meltzer-Richard (1981) provide a politico-economic explanation 
of the (excessive) size of government.  Cukierman-Meltzer (1986c), Alesina- 
Tabellini (1987a), Persson-Svensson  (1987), and  Tabellini-Alesina  (1987) 
show in dynamic models of fiscal policy how the level and the variance of 
budget  deficits can be influenced  by political competition.  This research 
shows  that political competition may generate a deficit bias and accumu- 
lation of government  debt above the "social planner" optimum.35 In any 
case, if there is a conflict of objectives between  the fiscal and the monetary 
authorities,  the dynamic behavior of government  debt is affected by this 
non-cooperative  interaction. 
The most useful way to address this point is by reviewing the argument 
of Sargent-Wallace (1981). They show  that if budget deficits are an exoge- 
nous process independent  of monetary policy (and the government cannot 
engage in Ponzi schemes), then restrictive monetary policies are unsustain- 
able; sooner or later the deficit has to be monetized,  because there is a limit 
to the amount of government  debt that can be held by the public. Thus, a 
tighter  monetary  policy  today  implies  a  looser  monetary  policy  in  the 
future. This argument,  however,  holds  only  in the case of "fiscal domi- 
nance", namely if fiscal policy is given exogenously,  and monetary policy 
is determined residually from the government budget constraint. Instead, 
an independent  Central Bank may hold onto a tight monetary policy, even 
with rising deficits; with no monetary accommodation the Fiscal Authority 
may be forced to adjust its budget policy. In the extreme case of "monetary 
dominance",  in which  monetary policy is given as an exogenous  process 
(contrary to Sargent-Wallace (1981)), budget deficits are determined by the 
Central Bank. Thus, independent  and tough Central Bankers can enforce 
fiscal responsibility when  it is lacking. 
An  empirical implication of this argument is that countries with  more 
independent  Central Banks should  exhibit lower budget  deficits.  Recent 
work by Parkin (1987), Masciandaro-Tabellini (1988) and Tabellini (1988b) 
suggests,  at least tentatively,  that this implication is consistent  with  the 
empirical evidence  of several countries in the last three decades.  Parkin 
(1987) examines the same sample of twelve countries as Bade-Parkin (1985) 
and  concludes  that "there are surprisingly strong links between  Central 
Bank laws  and  deficits."  The  countries with  more  independent  central 
banks  (particularly Switzerland,  Germany,  and  the  United  States) have 
35. In addition to these recent papers, there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature that 
addresses  the  political economy  of  fiscal policy.  For a  survey,  see  Mueller  (1979), or 
Buchanan, et al. (1987). However,  unlike the papers quoted in the text, this literature is 
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lower long-run average deficits and lower variance. Countries with more 
dependent  Central Banks (such as Italy) have higher long-run deficits. An 
exception is France, which shows  a deficit close to that of Switzerland and 
of  Germany,  both  in  terms  of  average  and  variability.  Masciandaro- 
Tabellini (1988) examine a smaller group of countries: Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New  Zealand, and the United States, and find that New  Zealand 
has  the  least  independent  Central Bank of  the  group  and  the  highest 
average of deficits, while the opposite holds for the United States. Tabellini 
(1988b) examines the current Italian experience in this light. 
Countries experiencing  "changes  of regimes" can also be used  to test 
these  theories.  Some indirect evidence  on this point is suggested  by the 
literature on  stabilization of hyperinflations,  particularly in the  interwar 
period.  Several  researchers,  including  Sargent  (1982) and  Dombusch- 
Fischer (1986), have  noted  that inflations and budget  deficits have  been 
stopped  when  a consistent  and credible change of regime occurred. The 
credibility of the policy change has been accomplished in several cases by 
means of institutional reforms which, in particular, granted more indepen- 
dence to the Central Banks, and limited the availability of automatic credit 
lines extended  from the Central Banks to the Treasury. The most obvious 
examples  of these institutional reforms took place in Germany in 1923-24 
and France in 1926. 
An important distinction should be made, however,  between  the steady 
state  and  the  adjustment  path.  Consider  the  appointment  of  a  new 
"tough" Central Banker, refusing to monetize the deficits. In the long-run, 
an equilibrium will be reached, but in the short-run the monetary and fiscal 
authorities might engage in "chicken games", as argued by Sargent (1986), 
Tabellini (1986), and Loewy  (1986). Suppose,  for instance,  that the Fiscal 
Authority is unsure about how  tough the new  Central Banker is; then the 
former may pursue an overly expansionary fiscal policy in order to test how 
willing the latter is to resist. On the other hand,  the Central Banker may 
respond with an overly restrictive monetary policy, to establish toughness 
and  force the  Fiscal Authority to change  policy.  This example  has been 
used  to describe the policy mix observed in the first two years of the first 
administration of President Reagan. 
Conclusions 
Recent politico-economic  models  based  upon  the  game-theoretic  macro- 
economic literature provide original and empirically testable results. 
After the influential work of Nordhaus  (1975), the literature on political 
business  cycles made virtually no progress on theoretical grounds for more 
than ten years, while  empirical results were  overall inconclusive.  Recent 46 *  ALESINA 
optimizing  and rational models  have  provided  novel  theoretical insights 
and suggested  original empirical predictions. This paper argues that these 
recent rational models  may  out-perform empirically the  traditional non- 
rational approaches and can shed some light on several empirical puzzles. 
With respect to the  "partisan cycles" of Hibbs (1987a), this paper shows 
that they may survive even in rational expectation models,  but with fairly 
different characteristics. Empirical evidence  of the postwar United  States 
indicates  that a "rational partisan model"  may  even  outperform Hibbs' 
"non-rational" model. 
The game-theoretic literature on monetary and fiscal policy coordination 
provides  important insights into cross-country differences in several mac- 
roeconomic  variables,  such  as  inflation,  government  deficits,  and  the 
monetary/fiscal policy mix. 
This line of research also has important normative implications. Models 
which  explicitly address the relationship between  alternative institutional 
settings and the economy  can determine the optimal institutional arrange- 
ments,  given  that "benevolent  dictators" do not exist.  For instance,  this 
literature provides  a conceptual  framework to  ask the  question  of who 
should  control the Central Bank, and it sheds  some  new  light on the old 
question  of "rules versus discretion." 
Only a few issues concerning the relationship between  macroeconomics 
and politics have been addressed here. For instance, this paper considers 
the  effects of  elections  on  the  economy,  but ignores  the  reverse  link of 
economic  conditions  to voting behavior and electoral results.36 One inter- 
esting  question  raised  in  this  paper  is  whether  voters  make  naive  or 
sophisticated  and  rational choices.  The  empirical literature on  voting  is 
inconclusive  on this point. For instance, results by Kramer (1971) and Fair 
(1978) (1982) (1987) could be interpreted as showing  that voters have very 
short  memories  and  that  their  behavior  can  be  easily  predicted  and 
influenced  by skillfully-timed economic policies. However,  similar empir- 
ical implications can be derived from a model with rational voters who have 
short-run information asymmeties  as in Rogoff-Sibert (1988). In addition, 
Alesina-Rosenthal  (1988) show  that a voting  equation derived  under the 
assumption of voters' rationality, and compatible with the model of Section 
3 of this paper, performs at least as well as the voting equations estimated 
by Kramer (1971) and Bloom and Price (1975). 
A second  important issue is the relationship between  political competi- 
tion  and  government  debt.  Several  recent  papers  have  introduced  a 
political dimension  to general equilibrium dynamic models of fiscal policy. 
36. Some of the most notable contributions in this area include Kramer  (1971), Arcelus-Meltzer 
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Cukierman-Meltzer (1987c) adopt the overlapping generation framework, 
and Alesina-Tabellini (1987a), Persson-Svensson  (1987) and Tabellini-Ale- 
sina (1987) use the framework of Lucas-Stokey (1983). These papers show 
how political forces generate a dynamic pattern of government debt which 
may be quite different from the social planner's optimum,  even  if every- 
body  behaves  rationally.37  An insight that emerges  from these  papers is 
that since government  debt is a link between  current and future govern- 
ments,  today's  government,  by  strategically manipulating  the  debt,  can 
influence the policies of its successors; this strategic behavior can generate 
a "deficit bias." More generally, these  papers demonstrate  that there are 
empirically testable relationships between  political institutions  and  fiscal 
deficits. This testing might help explain the wide variety of budget policies 
observed  across countries and time periods. 
A third topic is the politico-economic dimension  of international policy 
coordination. International agreements on policy coordination are set up by 
politicians facing domestic political incentives and constraints, rather than 
by  social planners.  Thus,  domestic  political games between  political par- 
ties,  and  international policy  games  between  countries,  are closely  con- 
nected.  Tabellini (1987b) and Lohmann (1987) provide useful  insights  on 
this issue. 
Fourth, the external debt problems of developing  countries are another 
clear case  in  which  politics  and  economics  are deeply  interconnected. 
Domestic political and distributional struggles affect the dimension  of the 
debt the use of external debt, and the choice of how to deal with debt crises. 
Thus, choices regarding debt are a function of the relative political influence 
of  different  groups.  Alesina-Tabellini  (1987b) suggest  a  link  between 
socio-political polarization, public external debt, and private capital flight in 
developing  countries. 
In summary, this paper suggests that positive models of economic policy 
cannot and should not ignore the political arena. Economists cannot ignore 
the political system and political scientists cannot ignore economic forces; a 
closer interaction between  the two disciplines would be extremely fruitful. 
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KENNETH  ROGOFF 
University  of Wisconsin 
1. Introduction 
After lying buried for more than a decade under the ashes  of the ration- 
al expectations  revolution,  the  theory  of  political business  cycles  (PBC) 
has  enjoyed  a resurgence  in recent years.  Alesina's  excellent paper sur- 
veys  some  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical developments  which  have 
breathed new  life into this area. The scope of the paper actually extends 
beyond  PBC's to other areas of "strategic macroeconomics," but Alesina's 
work on PBC's is so striking that I am going to focus my remarks on that 
topic. 
Even  though  one  can  point  to  some  shortcomings  in  the  underly- 
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KENNETH  ROGOFF 
University  of Wisconsin 
1. Introduction 
After lying buried for more than a decade under the ashes  of the ration- 
al expectations  revolution,  the  theory  of  political business  cycles  (PBC) 
has  enjoyed  a resurgence  in recent years.  Alesina's  excellent paper sur- 
veys  some  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical developments  which  have 
breathed new  life into this area. The scope of the paper actually extends 
beyond  PBC's to other areas of "strategic macroeconomics," but Alesina's 
work on PBC's is so striking that I am going to focus my remarks on that 
topic. 
Even  though  one  can  point  to  some  shortcomings  in  the  underly- Comment  53 
ing theoretical model,  Alesina's  results are striking. Today, when  careful 
empirical  work  in  macroeconomics  increasingly  points  to  the  fragile 
and  unstable  nature of relations between  macroeconomic  time  series,  it 
is  surprising,  indeed,  to  see  evidence  of  a  moderately  stable  political- 
macroeconomic  relationship.  If one  believes  that the  historical relation- 
ships  Alesina  detects  will continue  into the  future,  then  his  work  gives 
us  a simple  prediction: if the  Republicans win  the  United  States presi- 
dential  election  in  1988,  then  there  will  be  an  increased  chance  of  a 
recession  in  1990.  One  cannot  accuse  Alesina  of  making  two-handed 
predictions! 
2. Nordhaus's  Political  Business  Cycle  Theory 
The analysis of political business cycles traces back at least to Kalecki (1943) 
and Schumpeter (1939). PBC's have since been studied extensively by both 
political scientists and economists; perhaps the best-known  model in this 
literature was developed  by Nordhaus (1975).1  Nordhaus bases his analysis 
on the (presently unpopular) assumption  that the government can exploit 
a Phillips curve tradeoff, which is more favorable in the short-run than in 
the long-run. By expanding the money supply in the year prior to elections, 
incumbent politicians can temporarily increase employment,  without  suf- 
fering the full inflationary consequences.  Only in the long-run,  after the 
election,  does  the  public observe  a significant rise in inflation.  In Nord- 
haus's model,  it is therefore possible for an incumbent seeking re-election 
to manipulate myopic voters. 
Though Nordhaus  presented supporting empirical evidence  for a range 
of countries,  his model  was  criticized as not embodying  rational expecta- 
tions.  Critics argued  that even  if there are short-term nominal  rigidities 
[along the lines of Fischer (1977)], pre-election monetary expansions should 
not have any real effects. Elections are perfectly anticipated events  (at least 
in countries such as the U.S.) and therefore systematic pre-election mon- 
etary expansions  should  be  fully anticipated by  agents  writing  nominal 
contracts. Actually, the above argument only explains why there shouldn't 
be a cycle in unemployment,  and does  not preclude cycles in,  say, fiscal 
1. My understanding  is that a significant  draft of Nordhaus's paper had actually been 
completed  prior  to Nixon's 1972  election  campaign.  Nixon, one must understand,  is the 
all-time hero of political  business cycles. Believing that his 1960 election defeat was 
attributable  to Eisenhower's  refusal  to inflate  the economy,  Nixon  left no stone unturned  in 
his efforts to pump-prime  the economy in 1972. In his amusing account of Nixon's 
campaign,  Tufte  (1978)  presents  a copy of a letter  Nixon  sent out to social  security  recipients 
just  days  prior  to election.  Enclosed  with the letter  was a check  containing  a then  historically 
unprecedented  social  security  benefits  increase. 54  ROGOFF 
variables,  such  as  taxes  and  transfers.  It is  perfectly  possible  for fully 
anticipated  fiscal policy  to have  real effects  (at least,  under  fairly weak 
assumptions).  The real question is: why  would  voters reward an incum- 
bent who  cuts taxes prior to an election, if they know  that taxes will have 
to  be  raised  after the  election  in  order  to  compensate  for  those  cuts? 
Moreover, why  should voting be retrospective? Any action the incumbent 
leader  takes before  voters  go  to  the  polls  is  given.  Presumably,  voters 
choose  between  candidates  based  on  their  own  beliefs  about  which 
politician will provide them with higher post-election  welfare. 
The recent political budget  cycle (PBudC) presents  a resolution  of this 
puzzle; these  models  replace the assumption  of irrational voters with the 
assumption  of  temporal  information  asymmetries.2  As  Alesina  notes, 
PBudC models  predict electoral cycles  in  fiscal variables such  as  taxes, 
government  transfers, and government  consumption.  However,  they do 
not present a strong rationale for a cycle in unemployment. 
3. The  Hibbs-Alesina  Partisan  Political  Business  Cycle 
Theory 
The partisan theory of political business  cycles,  developed  by Hibbs and 
significantly  refined  by  Alesina,  is  radically different from  Nordhaus's 
theory. The main feature the two have in common is that they both predict 
business  cycles at electoral frequencies.3 Loosely put,  Hibbs posited  that 
Democratic administrations in the United States are more concerned with 
reducing unemployment  than are their Republican counterparts, and more 
willing to accept the concomitant risk of inflation. Alesina refined Hibbs' 
theory  by  drawing  a distinction  between  anticipated and  unanticipated 
inflation. Alesina argued that a Democratic administration should only be 
able to raise employment  systematically during its first year or two in office. 
Only  during  the  first part of  an  administration's term might  there  still 
remain any nominal wage contracts that were written prior to the election. 
When  signing  nominal  wage  contracts before an election,  private agents 
may still be uncertain as to whether  the high-inflation Democrats, or the 
low-inflation Republicans will emerge victorious. During the second half of 
any administration,  there is no longer any uncertainty as to the govern- 
2. In the PBudC models of Rogoff (1987) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988), the public only directly 
observes  government  investment  with  a lag.  However,  voters  know  the  government's 
objective  function  and  they  are  able  to  correctly deduce  government  investment  in 
equilibrium. Therefore, there isn't any information asymmetry between  voters and incum- 
bents in equilibrium. 
3. Actually, as Alesina stresses, the PBudC and partisan PBC theories are complementary and 
can potentially be integrated into a unified framework. Comment  55 
ment's inflation/unemployment  tradeoffs. Inflation will be fully anticipated 
and, therefore, neutral. 
In Alesina's model,  there is unanticipated deflation and high unemploy- 
ment  during the  first half of a Republican administration, and  unantici- 
pated inflation and low unemployment  during the first half of a Democratic 
administration.  During  the  second  half of  an  administration,  the  time- 
consistent  inflation rate will be higher if the Democrats are in office, but 
unemployment  is the  same under either type  of administration. Alesina 
tests  his  theory  on  post-World War II U.S.  data and,  as I have  already 
stated, it works remarkably well. 
4. Limitations  of the Alesina  Model 
4.1. THEORETICAL  LIMITATIONS 
There  are two  main  theoretical limitations with  Alesina's  partisan PBC 
model.  The  first and  most  important has  to  do  with  its  nominal  wage 
contracting structure. Having employment  fluctuations in Alesina's model 
would  require much stronger assumptions  than those in standard Fischer- 
Gray-Taylor wage contracting models.  If elections are such a major source 
of uncertainty, why aren't contracts timed so that they will expire just after 
elections,  so that new  contracts can be negotiated with full knowledge  of 
which party will be in office? Even if we accept that nominal wage contracts 
can  be  written  only  once  a year  (say,  due  to  transactions  costs),  why 
wouldn't  it be  optimal  for agents  to have  them  run from November  to 
November,  instead  of  October  to  October  (as  is  implicit  in  Alesina's 
model)? I believe that it may be possible to develop a partisan electoral cycle 
model which takes account of this problem, but I am not sure whether such 
a  model  will  have  employment  fluctuations.  Work on  PBudC  models 
suggests  that it is easier to rigorously rationalize electoral cycles in fiscal 
policy variables. 
Another question which arises in partisan PBC models is: why does one 
not observe the emergence  of a third party, one which better reflects the 
preferences of the median voter? It seems plausible to assume that existing 
parties have  some  degree  of monopoly  power,  but this issue  still merits 
further attention. 
I am optimistic that these theoretical problems with partisan PBC models 
can  and  will  be  addressed  in  further research.  Ultimately,  it would  be 
desirable to have  a fully-specified  equilibrium model  of partisan political 
business  cycles.4 
4. The political  budget  cycle  model  developed  in Rogoff  (1987)  is a fully-specified  equilibrium 
model. 56 *ROGOFF 
4.2 EMPIRICAL  LIMITATIONS 
The most  obvious  limitation of Alesina's  empirical tests  of partisan PBC 
models  is that he considers only a very limited set of data. This situation 
can partly be remedied by extending the data set to include elections prior 
to  World  War II (as  well  as  the  1984 election).5 But,  because  political 
institutions  tend  to evolve  over long  periods  of time,  and because  they 
differ across countries, it is difficult to develop  a really broad data set on 
which  to  test  the  theory.  It would  be  nice  to  generalize  partisan PBC 
theories in such a way that they can be tested on state and local data, and 
on  countries  which  have  differing electoral structures.  (Recent develop- 
ments have already made this possible for political budget cycle models.)6 
5. Conclusions 
Though  I have  stressed  some  problems which  need  to be resolved,  it is 
clear from Alesina's paper that there has been considerable recent progress 
in  research on  issues  at the  boundary  of  macroeconomics  and  political 
science. 
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Comment 
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE 
Harvard  University 
In  offering  comments  on  Alesina's  fine  paper,  "Macroeconomics  and 
Politics,"  I  am  a  bit  of  an  outsider-not  only  as  a  political  scientist 
addressing  economists,  but also as someone  bringing a micro-perspective 
to macro-phenomena.  Some of my remarks will reflect my outsider status. 
Were this a referee report for a journal, my  comments  on  this paper 
would  read: "Definitely publish. The comments to follow are only sugges- 
tive and should be left to the author's discretion to deal with as he sees fit." 
As a general remark, let me note that Alesina's fine paper, along with many 
that  he  cites,  displays  an  extremely  healthy  development-indeed,  a 
necessary development-in  attempting explicitly to model political features 
in theories of macroeconomic policy making. Over the last several decades, 
political  science  has  discovered  rational  choice  and  formal  deductive 
theories-equilibrium  theories,  if you will-of  political behavior and out- 
comes. These models share a familial resemblance to consumer choice and 
industrial organization models.  That is, they are typically microeconomic. 
On  both  the  political  science  and  the  economics  side  of  the  ledger, 
macro-efforts  to model politico-economic phenomena are of relatively recent 
vintage. So, my initial reactions to the literature that forms the substance of 
this  paper  is  a bit like  Samuel Johnson's  reaction to  a  talking  dog:  its 
remarkableness is not so much that it is done well, but that it is done at all. 
In the  remainder of my  comment  I want  to point  out  several  themes  I 
believe it would be fruitful to pursue in the context of the work reviewed by 
Alesina. 
1. Institutions 
The political-economic models  of Alesina are driven by the electoral and 
ideological incentives of political agents seeking national office. This is both 
familiar and widely  accepted by political science modelers.  It is generally 
conceded  that the "electoral connection" provides powerful  incentives  to 
professional politicians whose  decisions will have economic consequences. 
But, national electoral incentives do not tell the whole  story. Consider the 
following  three illustrations: 
1.1 Over the last decade,  the Senate Judiciary Committee  (a committee 
which  deals, among other things,  with antitrust policy) has been chaired, 
alternately, by James Eastland, a conservative Democrat from Mississippi, 58 *  SHEPSLE 
Ted Kennedy,  a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts, Strom Thurmond, a 
conservative Republican from South Carolina, and Joseph Biden, a liberal 
Democrat from Delaware.  Even if precisely the same antitrust policy had 
been  announced  and pursued  throughout  this period by the administra- 
tion in office, surely these wild ideological swings in committee leadership 
would  have strongly conditioned  antitrust policy. 
1.2 In the early 1980s, an unanticipated event  occurred: Senator Henry 
Jackson of Washington  suddenly  died.  He was  succeeded  as chair of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee by John Stennis of Mississippi.  Would 
an event  study,  using  CRSP-type data on  stock returns, have  exhibited 
abnormal  positive  returns  for  the  stocks  of  Mississippi  shipyards  and 
abnormal negative  returns for Boeing and other Seattle-based aerospace 
stocks? The point here is that unanticipated events in the  legislative  arena  can 
have abnormal economic effects, quite independent  of the national admin- 
istration's economic game plan. 
1.3  In the  late  1970s, consumerism  was  alive  and  well  and  living  in 
Washington,  led by three senior senators on the Senate Commerce Com- 
mittee: Magnuson  of Washington,  Moss  of Utah, and Hart of Michigan. 
Their will found  its way  into a number of public laws,  and  encouraged 
tremendous  activism on the part of regulatory agencies  like the FTC. In 
1978, Hart died, Moss was defeated for reelection, and Magnuson  moved 
to the chairmanship of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The people 
who  replaced them on Commerce gave that committee a substantially less 
activist  and  more  conservative  look.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  FTC was 
confronted on a number of its activities, accused of going overboard, and 
ultimately reined in. 
My point in each of these examples is that administration policy making is 
not the only driving force; thus, the electoral incentives facing administra- 
tion politicians are only part of the story. There is a crying need to model 
institutions and institutional actors directly, not just as parametric features 
of an administration's environment  (as Alesina describes in his discussion 
of  the  relative  independence  of  central banks),  but  as  active  strategic 
agents.  It is  along  these  lines  that  the  strategic independence  (or lack 
thereof,  depending  on  which  political system  is  under  examination)  of 
legislatures,  regulatory  agencies,  and  perhaps  even  courts,  as  well  as 
central banks, needs  to be explored. Comment  59 
2. Political  Parties 
In Alesina's paper, a party is treated as a unified actor-with  a reputation, 
or  "brand name,"  and  with  preferences  reflecting  a  tradeoff between 
ideology  and  office-holding.  This is  not  inconsistent  with  treatments  of 
parties in  the  political modeling  literature; indeed,  Alesina's  own  work 
advances  analysis  with  some  nice generalizations.  But parties are enter- 
prises,  not  individuals.  Since they  lack anything  akin to any  ownership 
structure or to residual claimants, it is probably best not to analogize them 
to firms. But industrial organization-like theories may contain interesting 
insights about parties. 
At the very least, parties should be treated as forums or arenas in which 
a game  is played  each quadrennium  between  office-preferers and  ideo- 
logues for the party's "soul." What I am saying, then, is that models should 
treat the policy ideal point of a party endogenously.  Moreover, prospects for 
entry  need  to  be  taken  into  account  so  that,  in  two-party  systems  for 
example,  entry deterrence should be part of an equilibrium description. 
3. Voters  and  Beliefs 
Alesina contrasts two polar views of voters: voters are either "nonrational" 
(or  what  I  would  call  "myopic"),  or  possess  "rational expectations" 
("perfect foresight"). In the formal political literature, these two types are 
referred to  as  "sincere" and  "sophisticated,"  respectively.  Now,  surely 
Alesina's emphasis on temporal consistency, as underscored in the rational 
expectations approach, has considerable appeal. But, it sits uncomfortably 
with notions like rational ignorance, incomplete information (by voters and 
by  parties),  and  the  notion  of  retrospective  (rather than  prospective) 
evaluation.  Political scientists  find  evidence  of  all these  things  in  their 
studies  of voting behavior. The idea of retrospective voting,  for example, 
has voter priors determined by past party behavior which are updated by 
current experiences.  This  idea  also  suggests  principal-agent  models,  in 
which  the  electorate,  as  collective  principal,  rewards  or  punishes  its 
electoral agent on the basis of both past reputation and current behavior. I 
believe  implications  derived  from models  that indicate no  role either for 
current experience  or historical reputation (as Alesina  discovers  in some 
rational expectations models he describes) are either extraordinarily  nonob- 
vious,  or just plain wrong. 
Along  these same lines,  there is an odd tension in some of the rational 
expectations  models.  On  the  one  hand,  rather heroic  assumptions  are 
made about voter rationality and beliefs; on the other, established parties, 60 *  SHEPSLE 
especially of the office-preferring type, come off as feeble-even  wimpy- 
in their capacity to act as oligopolists. 
4. Stationarity 
The most important political shock in the models under consideration is the 
matter of who wins an election. As Alesina suggests,  when  information is 
imperfect in this regard, post-election behavior will reflect adjustments to 
ex ante beliefs.  Ex ante beliefs  are modeled  in terms of a probability-of- 
election  function  conditioned  on exogenous  party positions  and rational 
expectations by voters.  This function is stationary in the sense  that if, at 
time t, parties take positions  D and R, respectively,  and if, at time t +  1, 
they take the same positions,  then Pt + i(DR), where P(.) is the probability 
that, say, D wins  the election. 
From election to election, however,  there are underlying changes in the 
voter distribution, which call this stationarity assumption into question: for 
example,  the entrance of new voters, the departure of old voters, turnout 
effects (ranging from weather to changes in eligibility laws and registration 
practices, to enthusiasm  for or disgust with party promises), even changes 
in voter tastes  (say,  life-cycle effects associated with  a "graying" elector- 
ate-today's  yuppies  become  preoccupied,  tomorrow,  with  home  mort- 
gages,  college tuition payments,  and the cost of nursing home  services). 
What  this  suggests  is  that  the  location  of  the  median  voter  is  non- 
constant-perhaps  even  endogenous  to the  strategic choices  of  political 
agents; so, too, is turnout. This would  seem to undermine the assumption 
of a stationary probability-of-election function. 
5. Political  Economy 
In conclusion,  as a political scientist I am impressed  and pleased with the 
research program ably displayed in the Alesina paper. The themes  I have 
emphasized,  you may rightly conclude,  are actually items on the political 
science  agenda.  That they are also of direct relevance to the concerns of 
Alesina  suggests  how  successfully  he has bridged both the  macro-micro 
and the politics-economics divides. If it is not a bridge across these chasms, 
at the very least it is a very successful high wire act! 
Discussion 
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do not appear, or why labor contracts are not state contingent or signed in 
a particular period,  say  right after the  election.  Furthermore, there  are 
certain causal patterns that here are taken as given and not tested. So it is 
not  possible  to  tell whether  low  inflation  countries  are associated  with 
relatively independent  central banks because of the bank independence  or 
because countries that prefer low inflation appoint tough central bankers. 
James  Poterba  concurred  and  mentioned  that  evidence  from  the  US 
suggests that local spending is only weakly correlated with the form of local 
institutions.  Hence  separating tastes from institutions  may  be  quite dif- 
ficult. Similarly, as John Taylor pointed out, it is possible that Republicans 
are associated  with  disinflations because  people  elect Republicans when 
they feel a disinflation is needed.  Fischer Black noted that Democrats may 
be more likely to be in office during booms. Alesina indicated that research 
is just beginning  to study issues  of reverse causality. 
Several  comments  questioned  whether  the  evidence  was  completely 
supportive  of the  theory.  Bob Gordon pointed  out that Democrats have 
often  been  in  office  during  wars,  hence  it may  not  be  surprising  that 
Democrats have presided over a number of booms. Robert Barro  suggested 
that the magnitude  of effects of elections should depend  on the degree to 
which  results  were  unanticipated,  and  this  might  be  testable; although 
determining the uncertainty of the outcome more than a couple of months 
before the election may be difficult. Others suggested  that the test of the 
theory  be  extended  to  cover  other  specific  policy  changes  and  more 
generally, be applied to data from other countries, as well as state and local 
elections. There was also considerable discussion of whether the empirical 
evidence indicated that voters were backward rather than forward looking. 
Alesina noted that with imperfectly informed voters, past outcomes will be 
important predictors of elections.  Finally, David Romer pointed  out that 
the horizons of central banks is not necessarily longer than the horizon of 
the  government.  Hence  central bank independence  need  not  be  tied  to 
inflation. 